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Abstract 
The legacy of World War II and Cold War weapons development and 
manufacturing is a monumental environmental cleanup program that is being 
managed primarily by the Department of Energy (DoE).  This program has been 
consistently recognized for the challenges it faces in cost growth.  Our research 
identifies the unique operational characteristics in which the program must be 
carried out. A model identifying remediation cost drivers is developed.  A review of 
best practices from industry and Department of Defense remediation efforts 
identifies actionable opportunities from among identified cost drivers.  
Keywords: cost type contracts, earned value management, acquisition 
planning, environmental remediation, cost proposal, contract proposal evaluation, 
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In the wake of World War II, the United States entered an era of major 
weapons systems development.  Specifically, the U.S. rapidly expanded 
development and production of nuclear weapons systems.  Since the 1970s, the 
Department of Energy (DoE) has assumed the responsibility of caretaker and 
remediator of Department of Defense (DoD) legacy weapons manufacturing sites.  
This responsibility includes removing, neutralizing, and/or monitoring nuclear and 
other hazardous wastes associated with processing nuclear materials.  The DoE 
relies substantially on contractors to carry out this cleanup effort, making the DoE 
the largest non-defense contracting agency in the U.S. government.  In 2009, the 
DoE managed nearly 200 remediation-related projects with a total value in excess of 
$320 billion (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009).  The magnitude of 
these efforts, combined with historically poor management and contractor oversight, 
landed the DoE's contract management on the General Accountability Office's 
(GAO) high-risk list for fraud, waste, and abuse in 1990 and continues today (DoE, 
2011). For example, inaccurate initial cost estimating contributed to the DoE 
requesting an additional $25 to $42 billion to complete nine of 10 projects reviewed 
by the GAO in 2008 (GAO, 2009). Costs for many of these remediation projects 
continue to grow and inadequate record keeping has made an accurate estimate for 
many projects extremely difficult (Peters, 2010).   
B. DoE Actions 
The DoE initiated efforts to address GAO concerns.  In 2008, the DoE 
completed a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) to identify problem areas and subsequently 
better focus its corrective action efforts.  The results identified weaknesses in areas 
such as project planning, manpower and training deficiencies, inadequate contractor 
oversight, and insufficient acquisition strategies (DoE, 2008b; see Appendix A for a 
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Following the RCA, the DoE developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in July 
2008.  It called for eight corrective measures aimed to address the RCA.  The CAP 
implementation satisfied three of the five GAO criteria for removal from the high-risk 
list, including demonstration of strong commitment and leadership, progress in 
implementing corrective measures, and development of a correction action plan that 
identified causes, solutions, and an implementation plan.  Remaining open areas 
include obtaining adequate capacity, including personnel to resolve its contract 
management issues, and the monitoring, validating, and sustainability of the 
corrective measure (DoE, 2011; see Appendix B for the full CAP list). 
C. Actions Remaining 
The first remaining issue involves adequate staffing and development of skills 
involving cost estimating, risk management, and technical expertise.  Second, the 
DoE must improve cost estimates for environmental remediation projects (DoE, 
2011).  The RCA was not specific in identifying which offices had cost estimating 
issues.  The DoE, Office of Environmental Management (EM) took the proactive step 
by establishing the Cost Estimating Center of Excellence in 2007 (Messner et al., 
2007).  While establishment of the Center of Excellence resulted in improved cost 
estimating, challenges remain as EM continues to look for ways to streamline cost 
evaluations in an effort to accelerate contract award.  Our research identifies 
opportunities to assist the DoE in the latter remaining open item.  
D. Preview of Literature Review 
We first review relevant literature to define environmental remediation.  We 
then examine the major parties involved in federal remediation.  After that, we 
explore community interests and regulatory framework.  This foundation allows us to 
discuss the major federal laws that impact the remediation contracting environment.  
Next, we examine literature to gain understanding in how the DoE may differ from 
other federal agencies and industries.  Following this examination, we look for 
literature on cost proposal requests and evaluation.  Finally, we discuss cost 
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E. Direction of Future Research 
This is an interim report.  As our research proceeds, we intend to perform in-
depth case studies into the DoE and the DoD remediation project requests for 
proposals, cost proposals, cost proposal evaluations, and effectiveness.  EM 
recognizes the need to adapt practices to meet its unique requirements such as 
different regulatory requirements, increased complexity of clean up, and waste 
characterization because of the radiation and others hazards on sites. The goal is to 
benchmark DoD best practices and identify ways that the DoE may implement 
changes to improve its cost proposal processes.  The primary objective is to identify 
procedures and practices that the DoE can implement to facilitate positive change in 
its cost proposal processes, thereby improving the overall DoE process and meeting 
one of the open requirements for removal from the GAO's high-risk list. In this report, 
we offer possible methodological approaches.   
F. Purpose of This Study 
This study explores the following research questions: 
1. What are the government and private industry best practices regarding 
environmental remediation contracting, cost proposal request, and cost 
proposal evaluation? 
2. What are the key observations regarding the DoE’s cost proposal 
solicitation and cost proposal evaluation processes for environmental 
remediation contracting? 
3. How effective are the DoE’s current processes in providing an accurate 
cost estimate? 
4. What policy recommendations can be proposed that may affect 
positive change to the DoE’s cost estimations for environmental 
remediation projects? 
G. Preliminary Findings 
After speaking with DoE personnel from Washington DC, Lexington KY, and 
DoD acquisition professionals at the Air Force Center for Engineering and the 
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we feel that although the DoD faces some of the same acquisition challenges, the 
EM challenge is unique.  A promising option for DoE remediation is a two phased 
approach, which is discussed further in the AFCEE and NAVFAC sections later in 
this report.  Two-phased contracting approaches have been highly successful 
strategies for the Air Force (AF) and Navy, and we recommend this strategy for 
further investigation and consideration for the DoE.  This interim report is meant to 
lay the groundwork for explaining the reasons as to why two-phased contracting 
would be more effective, however it does not address the mechanics of that 
strategy.  
H. Chapter Summary 
The DoE faces a complex and daunting task in cleaning up America’s 
hazardous nuclear waste legacy.  The magnitude of the work, accompanied by the 
DoE’s challenges in contract management and contractor control has landed the 
DoE on the GAO high-risk list.  The DoE has undertaken painstaking analysis to 
identify and develop corrective actions in order to rectify contract management 
challenges.  The focus of this research is to improve the DoE’s cost proposal 
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II. Literature and Interview Review 
A. Overview 
The focus of this research is to provide observations and examination of the 
DoE proposal process.  This chapter presents the relevant research, which 
establishes the foundation for our analysis.  In Section B we define environmental 
remediation.  In Section C we identify the major parties responsible for executing 
environmental remediation contracts.  In Section D, we explain the importance of 
community interests in environmental remediation.  Then in Section E we discuss 
how these interests bring about the current regulatory framework.  In Section F, we 
discuss some of the major laws that govern federal remediation contracting.  In 
Section G, we explain how DoE remediation projects differ from those of other 
agencies.  In Section H, we highlight environmental remediation success stories.  
Next, we explore cost proposal requests and their evaluation.  Then in Section I, we 
discuss cost proposal request and evaluation.  Section J covers cost proposal 
effectiveness in terms of DoD cost growth.  We discuss our initial observations in 
section K.  Finally, in Section L, we provide preliminary research method proposals.  
B. What Is Environmental Remediation? 
Environmental remediation covers a broad range of activities involving the 
cleanup of contaminated soil and water, the restoration of ecological environments, 
the removal and disposal of hazardous materials, and the decommissioning of 
facilities used to produce, warehouse, or store hazardous and radioactive materials.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides the federal regulatory 
framework and enforcement to ensure that responsible parties make the necessary 
restoration after contamination, degradation, and detriment.  The EPA enforces a 
wide range of regulations, but two main statutes govern federal remediation projects.  
As Momber (2005) wrote, “The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource Conservation and 
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to federal remediation projects” (p. 11), which we discuss in greater detail in a later 
section.     
As for the actual work that goes on in environmental remediation and 
restoration, it generally involves several distinct phases.  In an Air Force report, 
Reardon (1992), outlined environmental remediation in the following way: the 
preliminary assessment/site inspection stage, the remedial investigation/feasibility 
study stage, the remedial design/action stage, and the site closure stage.  For the 
site assessment phase, project personnel examine sites to determine whether they 
meet federal requirements for remediation.  The remedial investigation phase 
requires evaluation of appropriate actions to remediate a site.  The remedial design 
phase involves design of the remedial action determined in the remedial 
investigation stage. Finally, the site closure stage details the actions that project 
personnel take to close a site, which include documentation and communication 
(Reardon, 1992, pp. 1–5).  Reardon explained, from a non-engineering perspective, 
two main remediation processes: removal of contaminated soil and groundwater, 
and monitoring of contaminated locations.  The monitoring of sites typically occurs 
when contaminant risks are unknown (Reardon, 1992, p. 1-5).   
Environmental remediation contracts require recognition of more stakeholders 
than other federal contracts.  Typically, federal contracting officers consider 
contractors and government interests.  Contracting officers who are tasked with 
environmental cleanup must satisfy a greater number of stakeholders.  These 
include, but are not limited to, local population considerations, workforce interests, 
federal, state, and local regulators, and other political interests.  For example, public 
perception of radiological contamination can entail major issues from a contracting 
and government perceptive (Feldman & Hanahan, 1996). In Section C we identify 
the federal parties responsible for executing federal environmental remediation.  
C. Who Are the Major Parties? 
There are several players in the federal government tasked with 
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government regarding U.S. environmental challenges.  According to the DoE, “The 
mission of the Energy Department is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by 
addressing its energy, environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative 
science and technology solutions” (DoE , 2011). The program office for addressing 
the specific environmental challenges is the Office of Environmental Management 
(EM).  According to the office’s website, its stated mission is “to complete the safe 
cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear 
weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research” (EM, 
n.d.). The EM’s role is to provide the necessary contract administration, oversight, 
and program management to ensure that contractors successfully complete 
contracted  environmental cleanup.  Over the last 10 years, the DoE has received 
approximately $300 billion with one fifth of that going to environmental restoration 
and remediation. We generated reports in www.usaspending.gov for contracted 
work in the DoE and found that in FY 2010, the DoE received $25.1 billion.  EM 
receives an annual budget of approximately $5 billion (EM, 2011). 
While DoE is the only agency responsible for radioactive cleanup, it is not the 
only federal agency tasked with environmental remediation.  The AF, Army, and 
Navy all have dedicated missions concerning environmental cleanup.  In the AF, 
headquartered on Joint Base Lackland in San Antonio, TX, the AF Center for 
Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) is responsible for creating and 
implementing environmental restoration and remediation services and policy.  
According to AFCEE, the mission of Environmental Restoration Program 
Optimization (ERP-O) is to “maximize the effectiveness and minimize the financial 
liabilities and environmental footprint of the AF restoration program through 
competent technical leadership and guidance” (Air Force Center for Engineering and 
the Environment [AFCEE], n.d.).   
AFCEE is working under direction issued by the Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Installations, Environment, and Logistics, Mr.Terry Yonkers to accelerate 
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90% of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) sites by 2015, and 75% of non-
BRAC sites by 2015. Yonkers directed cleanup efforts to move away from process 
and study and toward entire installation completion results whenever possible by 
using Performance Based Remediation. 
Interviews with AFCEE personnel indicated that they utilize a two-phase 
remediation contracting approach. In Phase 1, a remediation site analysis and plan 
are prepared. Phase 1 is normally completed under a Time and Materials (T&M) 
type contract. In a T&M arrangement the contractor is paid negotiated labor rates for 
the number of hours required to accomplish the work (usually capped by a ceiling) 
plus allowable reimbursable material expenses. Phase 2 of the process involves the 
execution of the plan prepared in Phase 1. AFCEE refers to Phase 2 as the 
construction phase and normally y uses a Firm-Fixed Price contract for lasting 24-48 
months for Phase 2 
In Phase 1, remediation study and project planning are contracted via task 
orders issued to contractors that have been pre-selected for participation on a 
Multiple Award Schedule (MAS).  These 29 contractors have pre-negotiated labor 
rates, overhead, and profit with AFCEE for the contract period of performance.  
Individual tasks are competed amongst the MAS contractors’ capacity; technical 
capacity; past performance; and location in proximity to the work. After selection, the 
contractor and AFCEE discuss labor and other direct costs and the government 
compares them to the government estimate for the task order requirement.The plans 
prepared in Phase 1 are executed in Phase 2, wherein the actual construction or 
physical remediation work is undertaken.  Phase 2 work can be awarded to over 50 
different contractors under three separate MAS arrangements.  The first is a service 
based MAS; the second a construction MAS, and the third is a 
design/build/remediate/restore contract; which enables the accommodation of 
qualified small business contractors.  AFCEE has achieved remarkable success in 
defining requirements and executing to plan by using the two-phase approach.  One 
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AFCEE has experienced only three requests from contractors for equitable 
adjustments (additional funds for work that is out of contract scope), which is a key 
functional metric for contracting organizations. 
Similar to AFCEE, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
provide the Army, as well as state and local populations, comparable services. The 
USACE operates more independently and is decentralized in order for greater state 
and local integration.  The USACE’s mission is much larger than the AF because its 
tasks go beyond its Service agency.  The USACE staffs 52 different centers of 
expertise, many with environment missions.  The Environmental and Munitions 
Center of Expertise (EM CX) Directorate, located in Huntsville, AL, provides support 
for field offices executing environmental remediation: 
The USACE environmental mission encompasses the restoration, 
management, and enhancement of local and regional ecosystems. This broad 
mission includes the restoration of sites contaminated with hazardous waste, 
radioactive materials and munitions and their constituents.  The EM CX has 
played a vital supporting role in the identification and cleanup of contaminated 
defense and commercial sites throughout the Nation for the Department of 
Defense, the US Environmental Protections and various other federal 
agencies. The CX has used its knowledge to assist operating facilities in 
complying with environmental regulations, thereby reducing the legacy of 
contamination requiring future cleanup. The CX has also developed an 
integral role providing programmatic support to various customers. The 
overall success that the CX has had with these various activities can be built 
upon as the Nation’s environmental programs continue to mature. (EM CX,  
n.d.)  
Administration for the superfund sites vary by district and region.  Different 
regions staff environmental offices that are responsible for environmental 
remediation.  For example,  
Our [Buffalo] district's primary missions include: Environmental Restoration 
and Protection, Regulatory Program, and Hazardous, Toxic, and Radiological 
Waste Site Management [to include the Formally Utilized Sites Remedial 
Action Program (FUSRAP), The Defense Environmental Restoration Program 
(DERP), Formally Used Defense Sites (FUDS)]. (Army Corps of Engineers 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 10 
 k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Created in 1974, the FUSRAP is tasked to  
identify, investigate and clean up or control sites that were part of the Nation's 
early atomic energy and weapons program. Activities at the sites that are 
eligible for FUSRAP were conducted by the Manhattan Engineer District 
(MED) or the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), both predecessors of the 
Department of Energy (DOE). (ACE Buffalo, n.d.)    
The USACE maintains a close relationship with the DoE and the EM.  DoE field 
sites, responsible for cleanup operations, sometimes solicit USACE support.  Like 
the FUSRAP initiative, the DERP’s role is to cleanup all DoD contaminated locations 
to include FUDS.  The USACE’s insights, with its history of DoD legacy site 
management and clean up along with its experience with federal contraction 
projects, are substantive.  
In addition to the Army and AF, the Navy maintains a capability to conduct 
environmental remediation and restoration, the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC), headquartered in Washington, DC.  Its mission is to “[deliver] 
and [maintain] quality, sustainable facilities, [acquire] and [manage] capabilities for 
the Navy’s expeditionary combat forces, [provide] contingency engineering 
response, and [enable] energy security and environmental stewardship” (NAVFAC, 
n.d.). More specifically, NAVFAC defined its environmental mission as follows:  
NAVFAC's Environmental Program provides high quality, timely, cost effective 
and efficient environmental support to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and other 
clients. Environmental management is the means of conserving, protecting 
and restoring the environment and natural and cultural resources for future 
generations. We offer sound environmental management and technical 
support necessary for Navy and Marine Corps compliance with federal, state, 
local and host nation regulations. (NAVFAC, n.d.) 
NAVFAC uses a two-phase remediation contract strategy for projects in U.S. 
territories. The two-phase strategy is similar to that used by AFCEE. Phase 1 is 
known as “study side”. In Phase 1 NAVFAC issues stand-alone contracts using an 
evaluation process that allows them to first select the best technically qualified 
contractor and then negotiate labor rates and overhead with that contractor. 
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and labor rates.  A notable NAVFAC initiative in the proposal process is to 
significantly limit the number of pages of data that contractors may submit with their 
proposals. This initiative standardizes and reduces contractor proposal effort and 
cost, as well as the cost of government evaluation and audit.   
Phase 2 or “clean-up side” remedial action contracts are issued through a 
mixture of MAS or single-contract actions. NAVFAC policy is to issue phase 1 and 
phase 2 contracts to different contractors so that there is no organizational conflict 
between the two contract phases. 
NAVFAC is seeking to incentivize contractor performance by substantially 
limiting base fee (or profit), in some cases fee is limited to zero. Contractor profit is 
instead earned via award fee assessments that are limited to ten percent of target 
cost. Initial analysis of remediation contracting initiatives being undertaken in DoD 
organizations indicates that further investigation and identification of best practices is 
warranted and will be presented in a future report.  
As the DoD restores environments it damaged from past and current 
operations, the AF, Army, and Navy face similar challenges as the DoE.  Some 
challenges include complex laws and increased community interest (Momber, 2005).  
In addition, we have identified challenges with DoE proposal evaluation, acquisition 
schedule, and contract and requirements risk.  
D. What Are the Community Interests?  
The responsible parties in both government and industry who participate in 
environmental remediation projects must acknowledge the local community as a 
major stakeholder in the cleanup effort.  The DoE recognizes the seriousness of 
environmental contamination.  Issues arise regarding potential health risks to local 
communities, but there are also perceptions that affect the local community 
economically and socio-politically.  Furthermore, the DoE has recognized the need 
for local community participation for educational purposes as well as policy and 
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FUSRAP, researchers Feldman and Hanahan (1996) found that the local population 
had a desire to participate in remediation decisions. The local community was most 
concerned about health risks, treatment, and excavation (specifically offsite disposal 
methods). As for soil cleanup, the respondents viewed onsite remediation as the 
least preferable method.  They concluded by recommending to the DoE community 
relations program that the public needs to be informed and educated of the process 
and that the DoE must ensure open communication with the public (Feldman & 
Hanahan, 1996).  Community interest with stakeholder status is not the only 
perspective.  In fact, for environmental restoration and remediation, community 
interest becomes the driving force for such action. As we discuss in the following 
section, local community interest is not alone in making the remediation contracting 
environment more challenging.   
E. What Is the Regulatory Framework? 
Understanding remediation requires an understanding of U.S. regulation and 
environmental law.  As Findley and Whitridge (1996) described it, “regulations 
largely created the remediation industry” (p. 83).  Public interest, pushing for an 
effective bureaucracy to carry out environmental protection through federal and state 
regulatory authorities, harbors new challenges.   
Environmental regulations are an ever-increasing part of business, legal, and 
governing aspects of the U.S.  Optimistically, regulators come from unbiased, 
disinterested, technocratic perspectives and seek to rectify decades of 
environmental damage.  Pessimistically, regulators come from biased 
constituencies, or are themselves biased, regarding enforcement, communication, 
and efficiency.  The truth lies somewhere in-between.  In a study looking to 
understand regulators’ bias, Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) concluded that 
one cannot distinguish with the current information whether risk perception 
matters primarily because they reflect biases of regulators as individuals or 
regulators as representatives of constituents with biased perception, a topic 
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Whether regulators are biased, or come from biased groups, is a question of interest 
to students of psychological aspects of  regulatory expansion and enforcement.  
Socio-political theory might consider broader casual relationships for such 
phenomena.  For our analysis, Adler’s (2007) observation that wealthier nations 
seek greater environmental protection is sufficient.  This study does not question the 
political underpinnings; instead, we highlight the rapidly expanding regulatory 
framework and examine its effect on environmental remediation contracts. 
The DoE, like the DoD and industry, faces an exponentially growing 
regulatory framework.  Before the 1970s, from a federal perspective, the DoE self 
regulated while state and local agencies enforced their own environmental regulation 
and protections, usually without a high degree of standardization or efficacy (Adler, 
2007, p. 67).  Adler (2007) highlighted the nature of wealthy nations and their 
relationship with the environment when he wrote, “wealthier and more 
knowledgeable societies demand greater levels of environmental protection” (p. 72).  
Indeed, as the U.S. solidified its role as the major world superpower and enabled 
globalization, the luxury of environmental protections ensued.  One can look to title 
40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), which is a repository of federal 
environmental regulations. Cahill (2011) echoed Alder’s assertion with a graphical 
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Figure 1. Growth of U.S. Environmental Regulations 
(Cahill, 2011, p. 44) 
 
Environmental remediation usually requires the end state of site closure.  As 
the number of environmental requirements increase, the government and contractor 
encounter a “sliding bar” if state and local regulators are not involved in the decision-
making process.  Consequently, the performance measurement for programs 
becomes problematic if the regulators remain unsatisfied.  To avoid this kind of 
scenario, clear metrics and end states should be agreed to, as we discuss in Section 
H.  In addition to title 40, Allen and Shonnard (2002, p. 2) tracked federal 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Growth in Federal Environmental Laws and  
Amendments  
(Allen & Shonnard, 2002, p. 2) 
 With the rapidly increasing number of laws, remediation professionals can 
expect increased difficulty meeting regulatory compliance goals.  More optimistically, 
citizens should rejoice in the dramatic correction in lack of any environmental 
protections beginning in the late 19th and improving throughout the 20th century.  The 
increased environmental protection due to laws enacted before 1988 account for 
53–69% of the overall cost to business (excluding the superfund program; Crain, 
2005, p. 25). In any event, new protections are a challenge to government, 
contractors, and the U.S. taxpayer.  State and local regulators before the 1970s 
operated, for the most part, independently of the federal government.  Typically, they 
enforced highly disparate rules and regulations; the increase in federal involvement 
has brought greater standardization and consolidated enforcement.  As Adler (2007, 
p. 114) contended, optimal environmental regulation comes when federal regulators 
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Oppositely, the uncoordinated effort, lack of communication, and conflicting interests 
between federal and state regulators becomes an additional challenge to 
remediation efforts.   
From the regulators’ perspective, Adler (2007) pointed to some interesting 
findings: federal regulation does not always provide a floor for state environmental 
protection and there is no evidence for “the race to the bottom” among states.  In 
other words, poorer states will not weaken environmental protection in order to 
attract investment.  Although Alder (2007) found no evidence of a race to the bottom 
among states, differing state mandates create a diverse set of obstacles.  The 
impact wealth has on communities is more interesting than one would assume.  For 
example, when looking at water standards among states, Adler (2007) found “that 
increases in median income will affect the state environmental regime differently in 
relatively poor or rich state” (p. 156), where if a state with a medium income greater 
than the national average becomes wealthier, water standards rise.  But in the case 
of a state with a medium income less than the national average, increases in wealth 
will actually lower water standards (Davis, 2007, p. 156).  More specifically, Davis 
(2007) highlighted the differences in state standards; “states often do not take a 
uniform approach to setting all metal standards either stricter or weaker than the 
[National Toxics Rule]” (p.145).  States have an extremely broad authority to 
regulate hazardous (and non-hazardous) products and waste.  As an example, 
Jennings and Hanna (2010, p.11) demonstrated in a survey of state soil standards 
that Texas defines 1,888 different contaminant levels for individual pollutants, 
whereas North Dakota identifies one.  The solutions for federal remediation projects 
involving nuclear material exacerbate the differing state environmental standards 
and enforcement.  Constituencies are often hypersensitive to nuclear waste 
disposal, forcing state and federal elected officials to act on their behalf.  Political 
actors can interject themselves into the remediation decision-making process, or 
galvanize legislatures to prevent or alter outcomes. Although different state laws 
impact remediation decisions, a more in depth discussion of the major federal laws 
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F. What Are the Some Influential Federal Statutes? 
As previously mentioned, federal, state, and local laws and ordinances make 
remediation projects exceedingly challenging to execute.  For purposes of brevity, 
we examine the major federal laws that complicate the acquisition process.  For 
environmental cleanup, the DoE and the DoD operate in similar, albeit difficult and 
complex, regulatory environments.  In 1980, in order to address hazardous waste 
sites, Congress passed CERCLA, which established the statutory framework for 
post-hoc environmental damage. In the same year, Congress passed RCRA, which 
established a framework to limit the impact of current and future degradation.  What 
Momber (2005, pp. 14–15) called the “Environmental Law Conundrum” is the 
paradox between the signals these laws call for.  Although environmental laws help 
determine liability of parties who have or will have caused environmental damage 
(including the U.S. federal government), federal acquisition law requires contracting 
professionals to maintain fiscal discipline in an effort to protect the taxpayer 
(Momber, 2005, p. 15). As a result, contracting officials face a paradox: they must 
seek to fully indemnify the public through comprehensive environmental restoration 
or shield the taxpayer from excessive cleanup costs.  
The Brooks Act (1972) is another law that impacts the acquisition process.  
The law creates a federal policy “concerning the selection of firms and individuals to 
perform architectural engineering and related services for the Federal Government” 
(preamble). When contracting for architectural and engineering services, it 
specifically requires work as described by the law: 
1. professional services of an architectural or engineering nature, as 
defined by State law, if applicable, which are required to be performed 
or approved by a person licensed, registered, or certified to provide 
such services as described in this paragraph;  
2. professional services of an architectural or engineering nature 
performed by contract that are associated with research, planning, 
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3.  such other professional services of an architectural or engineering 
nature, or incidental services, which members of the architectural and 
engineering professions (and individuals in their employ) may logically 
or justifiably perform, including studies, investigations, surveying and 
mapping, tests, evaluations, consultations, comprehensive planning, 
program management, conceptual designs, plans and specifications, 
value engineering, construction phase services, soils engineering, 
drawing reviews, preparation of operation and maintenance manuals, 
and other related services. (Brooks Act,1972, § 901)   
It is a “qualification-based assessment” selection process that enables the 
government to request qualifications from firms, then select the best-qualified 
contractor, and finally begin negotiation on a specific contract (American Council of 
Engineering Companies [ACEC], n.d.).  An added challenge is determining whether 
the Brooks Act is applicable to specific projects.  For instance, the American 
Consulting and Engineers Council (ACEC) protested a DoE contract in which the 
contractor was a non-engineering firm.  This protest required the DoE to request a 
decision from the Comptroller General to determine Brooks Act applicability, which 
determined that the Brooks Act was not applicable (Comptroller General of the 
United States, 1982).  Brooks Act inapplicability extends to Maintenance and 
Operations contracts, which will be discussed further in Section H. 
The Brooks Act is not the only law that brings increased challenges; the 
Davis-Bacon Act (2002) also complicates things.  According to the Department of 
Labor (DoL), “contractors and subcontractors must pay their laborers and mechanics 
employed under the contract no less than the locally prevailing wages and fringe 
benefits for corresponding work on similar projects in the area” (DoL, n.d.).  
Interestingly enough, the DoL determines those labor rates.  Conceivably, union 
interests at sites where the DoE is the only major employer essentially bind the 
department to ever-increasing labor rates.  Although the DoE is not immune to this 
reality, the Davis-Bacon Act’s impact on projects does not give contracting officers 
as much flexibility as they otherwise would have.  Furthermore, compliance with the 
McNamara-O’Hara Contract Act (Service Contract Act, SCA) applies to all service 
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but the SCA seeks to protect services workers—not mechanical and wage 
workers—from competitive (lower) wages (McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act, 
1965).     
Finally, the Price-Anderson Act is another major law affecting the DoE and 
the nuclear remediation acquisition process.  As Berkovitz (1989) explained, “the 
Price-Anderson Act, as amended, governs liability and compensation in the event of 
a ‘nuclear incident’ arising from activity of Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees 
and [DoE] contractors” (p. 1).  He continued by explaining how the law provides 
coverage for contractors in projects that “involve ‘risk of public liability for a 
substantial nuclear incident’” (Berkovitz, 1989, p. 1).  In other words, the DoE 
practices self-insurance when it comes to its major environmental cleanup.  Although 
environmental liability is not the primary focus of this study, in a later section we 
describe insurance options that can offer possible solutions.  Although the DoD and 
DoE face the same legal obstacles concerning environmental law, there are other 
DoE challenges.   
G. Why Is Remediation Different for the DoE? 
Unlike the DoD, the DoE executes some projects with Management and 
Operations (M&O) contracts governed under the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) subpart 17.6.  These contracts limit available options for contracting officers 
due to specific clauses, such as the following:  
(d)  The work is closely related to the agency’s mission and is of a long-
term or continuing nature, and there is a need—  
(1)  To ensure its continuity; and  
(2)  For special protection covering the orderly transition of 
personnel and work in the event of a change in contractors. 
(FAR, 2005, subpart 17.604) 
One can immediately see two issues.  First, the general vagueness regarding the 
clause that identifies the regulation’s applicability, begging the question: what is the 
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transition? In any event, this section of the FAR makes the contracting environment 
more difficult for EM contracting officers.  
Researchers and DoE contracting managers understand the need to move 
away from M&O contracts.  Design-build contracts are a single vehicle for which "the 
total cost of the construction plus the cost of design are gathered into the design-
build contract" (Beard, Loulakis, & Wundram, 2001, p. 37). Person (2003) analyzed 
the use of design-build contracts and explained that the design-build contracting 
approach, at least within the DoE Weapons Complex, “had mixed results at best” (p. 
6).  The primary reason the Weapons Complex was not a total success is that the 
design-build approach did not allow for phasing of construction (Person, 2003).  The 
second problem involved major disagreement and numerous commenting over 
design preference (Person, 2003).  And finally, the design-build contract is not 
appropriate when the existing conditions are not fully known or characterized 
(Person 2003).  Person (2003) explained that “for those environmental remediation 
projects that present significant challenges in characterization and the like, cost 
reimbursable contracting may be the only viable option” (p. 6).  He concluded that   
for a variety of reasons, most subcontracts placed by M&O contractors should 
employ the firm, fixed-price contract delivery method.  The use of the 
design/build contracting model should be limited only to those situations 
where multiple processes can satisfy the desired result and where the M&O 
contractor can demonstrate that it will employ a ‘hands-off’ interfacing 
strategy. (Person, 2003, p. 9)       
The size and scale of projects are another way that the DoE is different.  For 
example, the DoE has over 100 remediation construction projects, and 97 cleanup 
projects with a total value of over $320 billion (GAO, 2009).  The DoD, on the other 
hand, has approximately 2,300 sites, with an estimated cost of only $35 billion 
(GAO, 2004). 
Additionally, the DoE garners a considerable amount of scrutiny from the 
GAO,Congress, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  For example, in 
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Subcommittee commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) to perform an overall review of the EM.  The report included myriad 
recommendations to improve Project Management, Organization and Management, 
Acquisition, and Human Capital (Messner et al., 2007).  In addition, the GAO's high 
risk list evaluation and review contain similar recommendations. The DoE is not a 
reactionary organization, it conducts internal reviews and initiatives in order to meet 
GAO recommendations and findings. For example, the DoE leaned forward by 
establishing the Environmental Managmenet Consolidated Business Center, it also 
addressed HR concerns in the field at regional contracting locations and continues 
to streamline aqusiiton processes (DoE, 2011).  In response to the GAO high risk 
list, the DoE performed the 2008 RCA and CAP which are instrumental to the EM’s 
transformation.  Although the EM has made institutional transformational change, 
there is still room to improve contract and project performance.  In the following 
section we identify examples in the DoE and industry that can shed light on 
successful contracting approaches.   
H. What Are Some Success Stories? 
Despite the challenges facing the DoE, and remediation contracts in general, 
there are examples of successful projects.  We review a few positive examples, 
highlighting successful contracting strategies.   
In August 2006, the DoE  released a report titled Rocky Flats Closure Legacy: 
Accelerated Closure Concept that highlighted the factors which led to the successful 
acquisition.  Located near Denver, CO, Rocky Flats housed legacy nuclear weapon 
production facilities. The Rocky Flats cleanup project was so successful it was 
awarded the Project Management Institute's (PMI) project of the year award in 2006.  
Policy-makers saw the need to accelerate the Rocky Flats closure due to suburban 
growth in the greater Denver area.  First, the notion of contract reform was 
emphasized; contracting personnel saw an opportunity to move away from the M&O 
contract model to a performance-based contract (DoE, 2006, p. 1-7).  The 
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departure from the cost plus award fee; instead, the contracting team employed a 
cost plus incentive fee.  Contract type was not the only aspect in the Rocky Flats 
success; there were other contributing factors.  First, defining a clear end-state 
vision, and ensuring that the DoE and the contractor maintained this vision as their 
primary focus.  Moreover, secondary and other objectives were “systematically 
eliminated” (DoE, 2006, p. 1-16).  Another key factor of success was teaming 
between government and regulators to properly identify a “fixed or bounding set of 
objectives for the cleanup end state” (DoE, 2006, p. 1-18).  The DoE should 
communicate these objectives with the contractor to reduce regulatory uncertainty.  
Another key factor, discussed in more detail in the following section, includes 
adequate site characterization (DoE, 2006, p. 1-18).  Additionally, the program 
enjoyed sufficient congressional support to a stabilized funding level, which greatly 
diminished program (budget) risk.  Another finding is that contracting personnel 
should use firm-fixed price contracts to the maximum extent for all known work, and 
cost plus incentive contracts where requirements are more uncertain.  In addition, by 
embracing performance-based contracting, the DoE fulfilled its role by managing the 
contract rather than managing contractor processes (DoE, 2006, p. 1-18).    
Another DoE success story is the Fernald Waste Pits located northwest of 
Cincinnati, OH.  The Waste Pits were a sub-project within the larger Fernald site. In 
2007, Fernald as a whole, project won the PMI's project of the year. Under the 
privatization model, with a fixed-priced contract, a contractor would “design, 
engineer, procure, construct, own and operate a facility that would undertake the 
remediation” (Cherry, Lojeck, & Murphy, 2003, p. 1). Project management used 
industry best practices, on-site labor, and support of the local community to bring 
about site closure.  This is not the first time researchers have looked at Fernald as a 
success, as Cherry et al. (2003) observed:  
The key components for success of the privatization contracting for the 
[Waste Pits Remedial Action Project] at the [Fernald Environmental 
Management Project] were Fluor Fernald Inc’s development of a strong 
procurement package, setting a reasonable capital outlay, along with a 
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technology, and the dedication to success displayed by Shaw as the parent 
corporation of the privatization contract for the WPRAP. (p. 17) 
A “strong procurement package” refers to sufficient requirements definition, 
boundaries and limitations of the project, and contingency plans for both known 
elements that may vary and unknown variables that may emerge.  The use of readily 
available technology facilitated competition, and as a result, minimized up-front costs 
and expedited capital recovery.  In environmental remediation contracts, complexity 
drives constantly changing conditions and results in contractor malaise or 
stagnation.  However, in the WPRAP experience, Shaw’s dedication prevented 
typical diversions, which was a key factor in site closure (Cherry et al., 2003, p. 7).  
Needless to say, this may have been an isolated case in which privatization was 
possible under the right circumstances.  Investigation of the variables involved 
provides an opportunity for future research.  
In a private-industry success, one company created an innovative technology 
in which it was able to, “perform, for a fixed price, all remediation activities necessary 
to achieve regulatory closure for known, and in some cases unknown contamination.  
[The] contract provides regulatory, performance and schedule completion 
guarantees” (Maierle, Cote, & Suthersan, 2004, p. 36). This resulted in the 
contractor securing market-rate project financing, with site closure within 30 months 
of initiating remediation activities, and as a result, area property values increased by 
a factor of seven in just four years (Maierle et al., 2004, p. 37).  In this case, a 
patented remediation technology enabled the contractor to offer its services with a 
greater degree of cost certainty, allowing it to use firm-fixed price contracts.  Such a 
technology solution, like most, is for a specific type of cleanup activity.  
Environmental remediation activities are exceedingly broad and varied, differing 
chemical contamination, water and soil composition, and obsolete or aging storage 
facilities all include different technology challenges that require a multitude of 
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As explained in the WPRAP and Fernald Waste Pits, the importance of site 
characterization cannot be underestimated..  Rigorous requirements definition will 
not only optimize contract type but also will reduce regulatory uncertainty, streamline 
remediation alternatives, and potentially improve cost construction and estimation.  
Another common element in the successful project examples was funding regularity.  
Achieved in two different ways, one through increased congressional support and 
the other through the use of standard technology, success is a function reducing 
program risk.  On the other hand, these examples also provide interesting contrasts. 
Contract types differ between the two projects; WPRAP used a fixed-price model, 
whereas the Rocky Mountain Waste Pitts used a cost plus incentive fee.  
Furthermore, readily available commercial technology in the WPRAP contributed to 
risk mitigation, whereas new technology in the industry example drove the 
purchasing strategy to a firm-fixed price.  It is important to note in both examples that 
technology played a key role in enabling the firm-fixed model.  Contract type is not 
the only mechanism to manage risk between contractor and government; insurance 
schemes enable parties to manage risk as well. 
Remediating contaminated, radioactive waste sites is a complex undertaking 
with a great deal of uncertainty and risk.  Although the acquisition strategies 
discussed have proven successful in past projects, insuring remediation projects is a 
promising strategy that has gained popularity since the mid-1990s.  Insurance 
provides four basic benefits for remediation projects: it improves land marketability, 
quantifies site risks, provides financial security, and spreads the risk of unanticipated 
remediation costs (GSA n.d., p. 1).  If and when the government can externalize risk, 
insurance companies can provide necessary support in quantifying environmental 
(and cost) risk, which brings about clearer statements of work and requirements 
definition.  Richardson (2002) explained this relationship, stating “insurance also 
promises reduced transaction costs for all involved” (p. 295).  Moreover, if site 
closure and eventual private development is the end state, improving marketability of 
the land via insurance is an appropriate course for the government, contractor, and 
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purposes.  The government can garner successful remediation contracting 
outcomes through the following policies: pollution liability (PL) policies, finite risk 
(FR), secured lender (SL), and cost cap (CC; “Environmental Insurance,” 2011, p. 
2).    
PL policies protect the insured against liability arising from cleanup costs, 
injury, and property damage.  These policies generally provide coverage periods of 
one to 10 years in amounts between $1 and $100 million (Yount & Meyer, 2005, pp. 
17–20). FR policies require the insured to transfer the entire expected cost and net 
present value of the remediation project to the insurance company, which pays the 
contractor as it achieves remediation milestones.  Generally, these policies work 
best on projects estimated to cost between $5 and $60 million and lasting between 
five and 20 years (Yount & Meyer, 2005, pp. 40).  SL policies, on the other hand, aid 
the insured party’s capital loan acquisition.  An SL policy "typically pays the lesser of 
(i) the anticipated cleanup costs or (ii) the loan balance in the event that a borrower 
defaults on loan payments" (“Environmental Insurance,” 2011, p. 2).  Smaller 
projects costing between $3 and $10 million benefit from SL policies.  And finally, 
CC policies define the insured party’s cost ceiling.  This ceiling is the estimated cost 
of the remediation plan.  The insurance company covers costs above the ceiling.  
CC policies cover projects costing more than $2 million because cost proves 
"ineffective for small projects" (Yount & Meyer, 2005, pp. 30).  Similarly, remediating 
contractors can purchase insurance when providing remediation at a guaranteed, 
fixed price.  On the surface, insurance is a simple solution to combat remediation 
uncertainties and risks; however, that is not necessarily the case. 
Insuring environmental remediation projects is often difficult.  First, significant 
cost accompanies insuring environmental remediation projects:  
the price of insurance is driven by the level of site characterization, the nature 
of the constituents of concern, the nature of the reuse (e.g., whether 
residential or industrial), the terms of the policy and limits of liability, the 
amount of the deductibles, and the expected costs of remediation. 
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Additionally, structuring an environmental remediation insurance policy entails 
great complexity.  Insurance program development is a "result of negotiations 
among the purchaser, carrier, broker, attorneys, and other parties" (Yount & Meyer, 
2002, p. 37).  Negotiation requires experienced negotiators and brokers, which 
becomes difficult when insuring multiple projects scattered throughout the country.  
Although it is difficult to implement, insurance can successfully mitigate project risk.  
Considering the large resources allocated for remediation, insurances would account 
for a small fraction of total outlays.  Although insurance costs require an increase in 
upfront funds, its use decreases project risk, thereby limiting long-term costs.  
States throughout the U.S. have implemented brownfield remediation 
insurance programs.  The EPA defined brownfield sites as, "real property, the 
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence 
or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant" 
(Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], n.d.).  Massachusetts established the first 
state brownfield insurance program, MassBRAC, in 1999.  The Massachusetts 
Business Development Corporation (MBDC), a "for-profit, non-governmental 
economic development organization" (Yount & Meyer, 2006, p. 12), administers the 
state's program.  In practice, the program pre-qualifies insurance firms to provide 
environmental remediation insurance.  Since its establishment, MassBRAC has 
yielded numerous successful remediation projects.   
In 1994, MassBRAC insurance programs enabled a local community to obtain 
$15 million in financing to remediate a former manufacturing facility.  Today, the site 
is home to a 40,000 square foot commercial facility, employing 140 people.  
Additionally, property values and economic activity in the area were enhanced 
(Yount & Meyer, 2006, p. 14).  In another case, a developer looked to turn a former 
landfill into a retail facility, but was concerned about the cost of remediating the area.  
The developer used MassBRAC to obtain CC and PL policies.  With policies in place 
private industry developed the land, which now employs "500 new retail, 
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when the government utilizes insurance strategies to carry out environmental 
remediation, it enables private capital the opportunity to enter the market for future 
restoration, reclamation, and development (Yount & Meyer, 2002, p. 6).  The DoE 
has attempted insurance strategies, but unfortunately they could not find willing 
underwriters.     
Extracting these success stories from the literature is no doubt useful, 
however, our initial observations of most current solicitation and evaluation practices 
will be illustrative as well.  The East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) contract 
employs the DoE’s newest methods for cost proposal solicitation and evaluation. As 
an initial comparison, we observe specific differences with Request for Proposal, 
Section L, between with the Savannah River Liquid Waste, more specifically, the 
Salt Waste Possessing Facility (SWPF) design/build contract and the ETTP.  One 
challenge to proposal evaluation is lack of standardization among proposals.  The 
ETTP resolves this by requesting clear reporting requirements for offerors.  For the 
cost worksheets, the ETTP requires cost summary and details through exhibits in an 
alpha-naming convention, A through G, with additional exhibits labeled H through Q 
as the contractor sees fit.  The SWPF requires the cost summary, and detail reports, 
through a less than clear narrative, with an alphanumeric naming convention F.1-
F.4.  Another way the ETTP ensures greater standardization among proposals is to 
describe clear, detailed assumptions contractors should use when building cost 
proposals.  The ETTP provides the typical assumptions of labor, overhead, 
escalation, rates, and fridge benefits, similar to the SWPF contract.  But the ETTP 
goes further, and provides contractors with specific assumptions about contract 
award schedules, funding profiles, and technical aspects relevant to the site.  As our 
research continues, the following chapter will use the ETTP methods as the proper 
benchmark for the EM’s current solicitations.       
Success is not isolated to a few DoE and industry cases; our study also seeks 
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the DoD we examine the general aspects of cost proposal request, evaluation, and 
effectiveness.  
I. Cost Proposal Request and Evaluation 
The acquisition strategy and contracting approach is very complicated and 
nuanced, not only for the DoE but also for the DoD.  We focus our attention on 
contract solicitation and proposal evaluation issues.  Due to the complexity and size 
of DoE projects, proposal request and evaluation has become onerous for both 
government and contractors.  The challenge contracting personnel face is 
developing clear statements of work, with complete requirements definition 
necessary for successful remediation.   
Unfortunately there is not a robust academic framework for proposal 
requests.  The varying nature of projects and differing contract approaches influence 
proposal request development.  However, as indicated in numerous acquisition 
guides and project management texts, requirements definition is fundamental in 
generating a definitive proposal.  As Lock (2007) wrote, “before any person or 
organization considers investment in a new project … the project requirements must 
be clearly established, documented and understood” (p. 29).  For environmental 
remediation, requirements definition includes site characterization.  
Complex engineering projects incorporate teams of highly specialized 
professionals from diverse fields.  Typically, engineering professionals define 
environmental remediation project requirements.  Contracting personnel use these 
requirements to generate the statement of work and ultimately the government's 
Request for Proposal (RFP).  In environmental remediation projects, site 
characterization is fundamental to requirements definition.  As Murphy and 
Herberling (1994) asserted, "perhaps the most critical element in writing a successful 
restoration contract is accurate, clearly written specifications or statement-of-work" 
(p. 48).  They explained that remediation project requirements are difficult to define, 
which "increases risk of failure" (Murphy & Herberling, 1994, p. 48). The authors 
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negative effects of their absence.  They highlighted the additional workload 
encumbered on purchasing and engineering personnel such as readdressing the 
government's negotiation position, communicating new requirements to offerors, and 
updating information for cost realism.  Problems are exacerbated when requirement 
changes occur post-award, leading to cost and schedule growth and potential legal 
action (Murphy & Herberling, 1994, p. 50).  
Regrettably, when the RFP contains vague or uncertain work requirements, 
the evaluation of contractor proposals becomes ever more difficult.  In addition, 
contracting officers face numerous challenges, not only from the technical 
complexity and issues with requirements definition but also from the different 
stakeholders and goals.  There are numerous strategies when determining the “best” 
proposal.  Our observations include one DoE contract with 11 “winners.”  That 
specific case is discussed in the next chapter.  What we can extract from the 
literature are ways to approach the alternative selection process.  The DoE and the 
DoD have guidance for government officials.  As Kiker, Bridges, Varghese, Seagar, 
and Linkov (2005) explained, the DoE has an eight-step process: 
defining the problem, determining the requirements, establishing goals of the 
project, identifying alternative methods and project, defining the criteria of 
concern, selecting an appropriate decision making tool for the particular 
situation, evaluating the alternative against the criteria, and finally, validating 
solutions against the problem statement….5 recommended evaluation 
methods include pros-and-cons analysis, Kepner-Tregoe (K-T) decision 
analysis, [Analytical Hierarchy Process], [Multi-Attribute Utility Theory], and 
cost benefit analysis. (p. 101) 
What Kiker et al. (2005) added to the discussion is an interesting approach using 
multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA).  They advocated a decision support model, 
which generates alternatives for decision-makers that comes with ranking 
alternatives using success criteria and weights on “value judgments” (Kiker et al., 
2005, p. 103).  Their approach included a synthesis of different methods for proposal 
evaluation; they concluded with the notion that no one approach is best (Kiker et al., 
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when the government makes a proposal selection determination the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) should select the proposal that represents the best value 
in terms of performance, schedule, and cost (DoD, 1998, p. 40).  The DoD Risk 
Management Guide echoes the FAR (2005) , “The objective of source selection is to 
select the proposal that represents best value” (subpart 15.302).  More important to 
evaluation processes, it explains proposal risk as “the risk associated with the 
offeror’s proposed approach to meet the Government performance, cost, and 
schedule requirements” (DoD 1998, p. 40).  In contrast, in its most recent edition the 
DoD treated risk in a more malleable, less deterministic way.  It emphasized the 
importance of risk mitigation, in which proposals should include contractor risk 
analyses, which help formulate initial Risk Management Plans (RMP; DoD, 2006, p. 
5).  Similarly, the DoE Risk Management Guide discusses processes to mitigate and 
manage risk, rather than derive upfront assessment and quantification of proposal 
risk (DoE, 2008a).  
The proposal evaluation requirements in the FAR are necessarily flexible; 
however, this leads to a lack of standard execution among agencies, offices, and 
individual contracting officers.  Appendix C shows the transcription of FAR 15.305, 
Proposal Evaluation. This is the primary tool contracting officers and Source 
Selection Boards (SSB) use to evaluate proposals.  As we discuss in a later section, 
ranking usually entails decision matrices, with accompanying weights.  The SSB 
reports include qualitative assessments to distinguish alternatives.  There is a robust 
decision science literature that demonstrates numerous quantitative methods to 
prioritize alternatives.  Moreover, researchers apply decision science to 
environmental remediation decisions; however, in our preliminary findings, we have 
yet to see this in practice among DoE personnel.  The following discussion briefly 
outlines a few common decision methods we observed in the literature.  
1. Decision-Making Methodologies 
Decision-makers both in industry and in the public sector have often preferred 
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rational) alternative remains an option to their policy or business goal.  This 
becomes exceedingly difficult in large, complex projects, such as environmental 
remediation.  Multiple stakeholders, the number of risk scenarios, and multiple 
objectives make the problems complex and the solutions to those problems all the 
more prescient. Saaty (1982) created one of the first decision-making models to 
facilitate optimal decisions of this kind of complexity.  The Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) attempts to disaggregate decisions by breaking down alternatives, 
outcomes, and stakeholders into hierarchies.  Saaty (1982) described several key 
concepts as follows: 
1. Hierarchic representation and decomposition, which we call hierarchic 
structuring—that is, breaking down the problem into separate 
elements.   
2. Priority discrimination and synthesis, which we call priority setting—
that is, ranking the elements by relative importance. 
3. Logical consistency—that is, ensuring that elements are grouped 
logically and ranked consistently according to logical criterion. (pp. 25–
26)   
Decision-makers and analysts can define hierarchies in many ways.  AHP is 
meant to be flexible; risks, stakeholders, and alternatives are all possible branches 
with their own hierarchies.  The depth of hierarchy should be a function of the 
knowledge available in the problem:    
Once the decision maker defines the problem hierarchies, the evaluation 
includes a pair-wise matrix operation.  This involves a priority setting where 
each aspect is measured against another, and the decision maker provides a 
scalar value to determine those values.  If there were seven elements the 
following table would show the construction: 
 
C A1 A2 … A7
A1 1    
A2  1   
.     
.     
.     
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       (Saaty, 1982, p. 77) 
Saaty (1982) described the comparison method: “To compare elements, ask 
‘How much more strongly does this element (or activity) possess—or contribute to, 
dominate, influence, satisfy, or benefit—the property than does the element with 
which it is being compared’” (p. 77).  AHP is a useful tool when prioritizing within 
program projects.  In addition, when the number of the evaluation criteria is relatively 
low, such as in EM SSBs, the comparisons and computations are manageable.  
AHP is not the only method to analytically evaluate problems with multiple criteria 
and objectives.    
The importance of satisfying multiple stakeholders is mentioned throughout 
the MCDA literature.  For example, Linkov et al. (2006) conducted a case study and 
found several conclusions relating to the value of MCDA applications in 
environmental remediation:  
The principal purpose of the MCDA approach is not necessarily to find the 
“best” decision but to improve the understanding of different stakeholder 
values.  The approach of eliciting these values in parallel to development and 
assessment of the alternatives at hand is unusual but it may allow for 
smoother introduction of new technological alternatives (such as beneficial 
reuse of contaminated sediments) at a more fully developed point in the 
decision process. (pp. 75–76) 
Linkov et al. (2006) rightly explained how MCDA can offer more information to 
decision-makers, not necessarily a more correct solution.  The non-inferior frontier 
will include multiple “correct” solutions; only with decision-maker indifference curves 
can the analyst rank the approaches.  One method that can avoid the additional task 
of building indifference curves is Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT).  In MAUT, 
analysts rank alternatives between 0 and 1 for purposes of prioritization using a 
linear transformation (or depending on the model, nonlinear transformations would 
be more appropriate). In more complex decision-making modeling, the MAUT 
approach includes parametric sensitivity analysis due to uncertain value 
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Other researchers, in contrast, make the effort to define a more succinct 
evaluation process for decision-makers.  Lahlou and Cantor (1993) advocated a 
three-step approach: “preliminary screening, intermediary screening, and final 
evaluation and selection” (pp. 57–58).  The preliminary phase includes inclusionary 
and exclusionary criteria to make initial judgments more manageable for contracting 
officers.  The second phase includes two screening methods.  Lahlou and Cantor 
(1993) applied weights to impact magnitude or outcome estimation, and a partial 
ordering into “trichotomic classification” (pp. 57–58).  The first approach includes a 
classical unranked paired comparison, and the second method an Eigen value on a 
1–9 scale.  The authors described their final phase, final evaluation, and selection in 
the following way: 
This phase provides a unique evaluation procedure, which develops two 
rankings of the alternatives: an optimized and a compromised ranking.  The 
procedure provides for multi-level hierarchical representation of the decision 
problem and uses the Eigen-value method to derive the importance weight 
coefficients of the decision criteria based on a ratio scale (Saaty, 1980).  The 
two aggregation models incorporated in this procedure consist of a weighting-
summation model and a compromise programming model.  The rating of the 
alternatives with respect to lower level criteria uses a normalized interval 
scale.  This absolute scaling system provides a stability of the rankings, 
however, the overall scores obtained are intervally scaled. (Lahlou & Cantor, 
1993, p. 58) 
The authors described a two-part process that utilizes the AHP (Eigen-value) 
method for the alternative prioritization ranking.  According to this approach, the 
optimal decision would not get screened, and by applying both a weighting 
summation model and compromise program, the analyst can provide an internal 
check of the rankings. In regards to AHP application, when the decision-maker’s 
value function is ill-defined or non-existent, the value of AHP decreases dramatically.  
AHP can properly address the relative prioritization; however, without a value 
function, it will fail to filter categorically suboptimal alternatives.  This is especially the 
case when analysts screen initial alternatives. Despite AHP’s analytical approach to 
knowledge-based decision-making, as problem complexity increases analysis 
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theoretical objections that have been raised to the AHP, the approach seems overly 
complex, with the need for sometimes extensive pairwise comparisons of 
alternatives and extensive mathematical calculations to determine rankings" (p. 
260). In a strategic setting AHP is insightful, yet considering the challenges 
contracting officers face, it is often impractical for operational decision-making.  
There are plenty of methods to employ when determining the most appropriate 
proposal; MCDA, MUAT, AHP, and other strategic decision-making processes have 
their place. Although, in the current DoE contracting environment, a goal to minimize 
upfront work should be sought especially if cost proposals, no matter how detailed, 
and evaluations, no matter how analytically based, do not surmount actual life cycle 
costs.    
Before one examines the numerous aspects involved in environmental 
remediation cost proposals, in either the DoE or the DoD, a careful and thoughtful 
discussion of cost growth is necessary.  Specifically addressing historical cost-
growth experiences, how to identify cost drivers, and categorization in project cost 
accounting. 
J.  Cost Proposal Effectiveness 
A cost proposal attempts to estimate the total cost of a contract.  Cost 
proposal effectiveness refers to the accuracy of the estimated cost.  Typically, 
decision-makers, program managers, and analysts are less concerned about those 
programs with actual costs less than the original estimates.  Good management 
practices will ensure that these instances are not overlooked for the purposes of 
lessons learned, but programs completed under cost are not a source of 
controversy. Conversely, the programs that experience total costs above the original 
estimates often lead to greater scrutiny, credibility loss, program cancellation, and 
political fallout.  The programs whose costs exceed the initial (and even ongoing) 
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1. Cost Growth 
Cost growth is not a phenomenon unique to the DoE.  In fact, the DoD has a 
long and infamous history of cost growth.  Since its early history, the U.S. has 
experienced challenges in military contract cost growth, such as in the 1794 
construction of six frigates. The project had an innovative design, with competing 
requirements, state of the art materials, and political bickering over project necessity 
and expenditures. The contractor ensured several geographic constituencies to 
maintain political support (Cancian, 2010, pp. 391–392).  And like programs today, 
the frigate program experienced “cost growth and schedule slippage,” which 
prompted congressional inquiries (Cancian, 2010, p. 392).  
Business and government planners observe two forms of cost growth: 
unexpected and expected.  From a strategic perspective, replacing legacy systems 
with more capital intensive, cutting-edge technology, requiring greater support 
systems, and systems integration inevitably leads to greater expected costs. A 
special panel on the Defense Procurement Procedures of the Committee on Armed 
Services explained cost growth in two categories: controllable and uncontrollable.  
Uncontrollable cost growth includes factors such as inflation, natural disasters, and 
other episodes beyond management control, which no one can rectify.  For this 
reason, our study does not address it.  Calcutt (1993, p. 15) cited a 1982 House 
Appropriation Subcommittee’s definition of controllable cost growth as the growth 
due to decision-making within an acquisition program . Our research seeks to 
address the unexpected-controllable disparity between cost estimation and cost 
reality; as some DoD authors plainly put it, “one way to reduce the amount of 
unexpected cost growth is to develop better cost estimates” (Sipple, White, & 
Greiner, 2004, p. 79).  Unexpected cost growth comes about when cost forecasts do 
not properly predict the future; and as Yelle (1974) reminded readers, “a forecasting 
methodology that does not require a degree of crystal-ball gazing has yet to be 
developed” (p. 8).  There are different ways to attribute or categorize cost growth. 
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bane to the U.S. taxpayer, provides a wonderfully secure means of employment.  
Our study looks at DoD cost-growth experience to extract insight for the DoE. 
Despite the above-mentioned parceling between controllable, uncontrollable, 
expected, and unexpected cost growth, we need to identify, for our analysis, what 
cost growth describes.  Cost growth is an a prosteriori construct, as the 
measurement between actual cost and estimated cost.  The cost estimate, is an a 
priori construct, therefore, it will never “expect” or anticipate cost growth.  As a 
decision support tool, the estimate can deliver a probabilistic range and 
accompanying risk profile to increase information for decision-makers.  To arrive at 
an estimate, cost drivers include the major cost categories that account for total cost, 
yet dynamic costs are not determinants of cost-estimate changes. This distinction 
will become more important in our model discussion.   
Modern policy and academic research with the aim to address defense 
industry cost growth dates back to the early 1960s.  An outcome due to the intense 
Cold War build up, when costs initially took a backseat, decision-makers realized the 
need to at least identify this phenomenon. Researchers have long identified 
acquisition challenges; yet policy-makers fail to curtail incidences of cost growth. 
Peck and Scherer (1962) are two of the first academics to identify cost-growth 
phenomena, or at least the differences the defense industry faces as opposed to 
more classically oriented markets.  They successfully provided practitioners and 
policy-makers with the proper background and information to better understand the 
acquisition environment.  In their description of cost and schedule growth, Peck and 
Scherer (1962) stated, “development time estimates frequently turn out to be 
erroneous by as much as 100%, and early development cost projections by even 
greater margins” (p. 300). They found that the contractors typically use overly 
optimistic projections, and the government attempts to correct these but fail because 
it operates under incomplete information (Peck & Scherer, 1962, p. 301).  Peck and 
Scherer attributed acquisition shortcomings to the defense industry’s distinctiveness 
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development activities, whose outcomes are generally considered to be highly 
unpredictable” (Peck &  Scherer, 1962, p. 25).  Another aspect they concluded was 
a root cause in weapon acquisition is that defense programs entail greater internal 
risk, due to the use of cutting edge technology, more so than other in industries 
(Peck & Scherer, 1962, p. 45).  Although technology risk remains a factor for today’s 
cost growth, it is no longer a central theme, just part of a larger story.   
Today, the DoD continues to struggle with cost growth.  The DoD, despite 
having a career field dedicated to cost estimating and forecasting, cannot seem to 
prevent unexpected cost growth. O’Neil (2011), a researcher and practitioner in the 
cost-estimating field, provided worthy insights by addressing  the incentive issues 
imbedded in the acquisition process:  
If they [contractors] promise too much, then they may come to regret it in a 
few years.  Yet, if they promise too little, they will lose out at once to a 
competitor. In such circumstances, the incentives weigh heavily on the side of 
accepting future risks rather than immediate ones. (O’Neil, 2011, p. 284)   
This signaling problem is the very same issue we find in all major government 
acquisitions, especially as the number of firms decreases and the likelihood for 
future opportunities remains—as in environmental remediation.  Another important 
insight O’Neil (2011) offered includes the issues surrounding cost realism and 
source selection:   
In principle the government can reject offers deemed unrealistic, as it does 
when offerors omit some significant element or make a demonstrable error.  
But a source selection authority cannot simply substitute his or her own 
judgment for the contractor’s regarding prospective improvement or advances 
in development or production.  Even at best, attempting to distinguish 
degrees of realism among competing proposals, in many cases, is fraught 
with unforeseen difficulties. (p. 284) 
Some in the source-selection business might take exception to O’Neil’s 
observation; however, his point is very important, especially for our study.  The 
amount of work and analysis that goes into source selection at best ensures 
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and complex remediation projects.  Thus, acquisition personnel, in an increasingly 
litigious contracting environment, require large and complex proposals.  These 
proposals come with equally large and complex cost estimates.  The SSB must 
conduct drawn-out and costly reviews, exceedingly difficult analysis of alternatives, 
and lengthy internal and external audits.  This is not to say that upfront resource 
allocation is inappropriate for site characterization and clear statements of work, but 
the onerous cost proposal construction and evaluation are probably not as important 
as they afford themselves.  Because of a long history of cost growth, the DoD 
continues to implement corrective measures to stymie cost growth.  Abate (2004, p. 
3) studied the effects of acquisition reform initiatives on missile system cost growth 
and build timeline for recent acquisition reforms.  Figure 3 shows the timeline. 
 
Figure 3. Current Acquisition Reform Initiatives (1991–2003) 
(Abate, 2004, p. 3) 
All the initiatives have goals in reducing work that is considered not valuable 
to the objectives.  Beginning with Nation Performance Review (NPR), in 1992, the 
DoD made efforts to move away from a bureaucracy focused to a customer oriented 
acquisition strategy (Abate, 2004, p. 26).  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
of 1994 (FASA), overhauled the DoD acquisition system by reducing the number of 
statutes, transitioned hardcopy items into electronic media, process re-engineering, 
and introduced past performance as a attribute for source selection.  (Abate, 2004, 
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focused initiative that was meant to “link information technology (IT) investments to 
agency accomplishments and establish a process to select, manage, and control IT 
expenditures” (Abate, 2004, p.29).  The DoDD 5000 rewrite in 1997 was the first 
major overhaul of the regulation (Abate, 2004, p. 30-31).  It dramatically simplified 
regulatory guidance for acquisition professionals; it separated mandatory and 
discretionary use of funds, as well as separating major information systems from 
other acquisition programs (Abate, 2004, p. 31).  In 2002, in accordance with 
guidance directed by Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the DoD 
suspended the DoDD 5000 until 2003, where policy makers sought greater 
acquisition flexibility, more streamlining with a favorable implementation environment 
(Abate, 2004, p. 31)  
 More changes to the DoDD 5000 have occurred since Abate’s analysis.  In 
2009, several DOD initiatives attempted to curb the prevalence of weapon system 
cost growth.  The DoD unveiled more revisions to the DoDD 5000 series, according 
to Schwartz, the changes  “[include] a mandatory requirement for competitive 
prototyping, more of an emphasis on systems engineering and technical reviews, 
and a requirement that all programs go through a Material Development Decision 
process prior to entering the acquisition system” (2010, p. 16).  Schwartz also 
summarizes the changes as a result of recently enacted laws, to include the Duncan 
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act and the Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform (WSAR) Act of 2009.  They create a new cost review system, more 
acquisition billets for senior military personnel, and an expedited review process for 
combatant commanders to enhance requirements generation. In addition, the WSAR 
creates a position of Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Director 
of Developmental Test and Evaluation, and Director of Systems Engineering, who 
directly reports to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) (Schwartz, 2010). 
Every few years, the DoD agencies re-attack the cost-growth problem.  This 
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that the solutions and their implementation have never been correct.  According to 
O’Neil’s (2011) analysis of the situation,  
(a) [cost growth] is a limited but persistent phenomenon, which has not 
improved in any material respect over at least the last four decades; (b) it is 
not unique to defense; (c) cost growth may flow from a variety of causes—
including errors in the management or contracting process—but defects in the 
original concept are a very common cause; (d) a limited group of similar 
remedies have repeatedly been tried but achieved very little success due to 
lack of clear analysis of underlying causes; and (e) research by social 
management sciences points to a corrective technique, “taking the outside 
view” or “reference class forecasting." (p. 279) 
He acknowledged the DoD’s inability to implement remedies because of poor 
or unclear analysis of root causes.  For example, the AF’s latest attempt to address 
cost growth employs the “Will Cost/Should Cost” approach in which the Will Cost is 
the government independent cost estimate (ICE), and the Should Cost establishes 
an internal goal for the government to seek.  As if something is better than nothing, 
Martin (2011) explained that the Will Cost/Should Cost numbers will help program 
management.  In other words, this is a way to help program managers and analysts 
maintain greater focus on getting programs under cost.  The Will Cost/Should Cost 
approach seems to avoid the question of whether the Should Cost should be the Will 
Cost, where the proverbial “just try harder” mentality prevails and certainly avoids 
the incentive problems.  O’Neil’s (2011) aforementioned analysis called for the 
academic and strategic focus to prevent these kinds of overly optimistic, arbitrarily 
implemented, and ultimately flawed initiatives.  Therefore, we attempt to synthesize 
literature, looking at the nature of cost-growth trends and, if possible, addressing 
root causes.   
The extant literature is replete with cost-growth studies.  We discuss the 
major works that help describe program characteristics, which identify those 
programs subject to higher cost growth.  Sipple, White, and Greiner (2004) 
conducted a survey of studies of cost growth in DoD acquisitions.  They analyzed 
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1993, NAVAIR, Christensen and Templin, Eskew, Institute for Defense Analyses 
(IDA), and RAND 2001.   
The BMDO study identified significant cost growth in Research Development 
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) with less than 16% of programs completing at target 
or lower cost.  The BMDO study also revealed that programs with lower dollar values 
typically maintained greater probability of cost growth (Coleman, Summerville, & 
Dameron, 2000).   
The RAND study from 1993, to reiterate Sipple et al.’s (2004) synopsis, found 
that smaller programs experience more cost growth and the RDT&E stage 
encounters more cost growth than production.  In addition, they found that those 
programs with longer life cycles have a greater probability of cost growth.  The 
RAND study showed that cost growth is more likely in a “new start program” than a 
“modification” program (Drezner, Jarvaise, Hess, Hough, & Norton, 1993).  
Sipple et al.’s (2004) analysis of the NAVAIR study found that there is no 
difference in likelihoods of cost growth among program sizes.  Cost growth “var[ies] 
by commodity” and by programs with different characteristics (Sipple et al., 2004, p. 
80).  Most interestingly, there has been a reduction in cost growth in the post-Cold 
War era.  
 The Christensen and Templin (2000) study covered the use of management 
reserve; they found that fixed-price contracts use more management reserve than 
cost-reimbursement contracts.  They also found that there is no difference in the use 
of management reserve between production and RTD&E stages (Christensen & 
Templin, 2000).   
The Eskew (2000) study focused on the difference among fighter programs. 
The study found 90% of the variation between programs is accounted for by weight, 
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The IDA study discovered the relationship in production and RTD&E between 
schedule growth and cost growth.  In addition, the intensity of the testing phase, the 
exigency of the program, and the complexity of the technology all are cost-growth 
factors (Tyson, Harmon, & Utech, 1994).   
Finally, the RAND 2001 study focused on the Joint Strike Fighter.  RAND 
researchers found that there is no statistical difference between competitive and 
non-competitive solicitations in both procurement and development cost factors 
(Birkler et al., 2001).  Sipple et al. (2004) made the observation that “it should also 
be clear to the estimator that more often than not, estimates will be low” (p. 89).  
They then explained a two-part solution such that “the two sides of the solution coin 
are: more realistic baseline estimates (with accompanying risk dollars) and better 
cost control” (p. 89).  As any practitioner would know and understand, although 
Sipple at al. provided a clear and simple solution, it came with opaque and complex 
challenges. Cost growth has an elusive nature, intuitively and empirically, front-end 
acquisition stages have greater cost risk.  Despite the lack of academic consensus, 
those studies that find no differences in cost growth by states of acquisition are in 
the minority. The DoD, in an effort to at least begin to categorize cost growth, is our 
baseline approach for analyzing DoE cost growth.   
In a different IDA report, Tyson, Balut, Om, and Welman (1990) described 
how the Strategic Acquisition Reports (SARs) categorize cost growth, stating, “as 
the program progresses, variances from planned costs are reported in the following 
categories: Economic, Quantity, Schedule, Engineering, Estimating, Support, Other” 
(p. 3).  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) mandates the use of these 
categories when reporting cost variance.  Fast (2007) offered definitions for each 
variance category, shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. DoD Categories of Cost Changes 
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Quantity  Cost Variance resulting from a change in the number of end 
items being procured 
Other Changes in program cost due to natural disasters, work 
stoppage, and similarly unforeseeable events not covered in 
other variance categories.  
Support Changes in program cost associated with training and training 
equipment, peculiar support equipment, data, operational site 
activation, and initial spares and repair parts.  
Schedule Cost variance resulting from a change in procurement or delivery 
schedule, completion date, or intermediate mile stone for 
development or production 
Engineering Cost variance resulting from an alteration in the physical or 
functional characteristics of a system or item delivered, to be 
delivered, or under development after establishment of such 
characteristics 
Economic  Cost variance resulting from price-level changes in the economy, 
including changes resulting from actual escalation that differs 
from the previously assumed and from revisions to prior 
assumptions of future escalation  
Estimating Cost variance due to correction of an error in preparing the 
baseline cost estimate, refinement of a prior current estimate, or 
a change in program or cost estimating assumptions and 
techniques  
The DoD categorization is no doubt useful for reporting purposes; however, 
from an analysis perspective it does not encapsulate root causes or cost-change 
interconnectedness.  Figure 4 conceptualizes the DoD cost growth categories. Note 
that these are not relationships between variables per se, but they help begin to 
paint the picture for cost growth accounting.  For the DoE experience, these cost-
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Figure 4. Cost Accounting Model 
The model lends itself to attribute cost change, and several studies show 
ways researchers integrate them into more in-depth analyses.  For example, Bolten, 
Leonard, Arena, Younossi, and Sllinger (2008, p. 21) analyzed the cost-change 
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Table 2. RAND Matrix 
(Bolten et al., 2008, p. 21) 
 
Bolton et al. (2008) found that contractor performance is the primary result of cost 
growth.  But the specific reasons are more interesting.  They concluded that  
most decision-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22%), 
requirements growth (13%), and schedule changes (9%). Cost estimation 
(10%) is the only large contributor in the errors category.  Growth due to 
financial and miscellaneous causes is less than 4% of the overall growth. 
(Bolten et al., 2008, p. xvi) 
More illuminating, they argued that the root causes of cost growth act as “trigger 
events” in which one unforeseen event starts a chain of probabilistic events, and 
they identified four major triggers: “program restructuring, change in schedules, 
increased requirements (either alone, or as continuing product-improvement 
programs), and errors in initial cost estimates” (Bolten et al., 2008, p. 81).  In order to 
prevent these kinds of trigger events, the acquisition process must ensure 
appropriate requirements definition in order to arrive at sound cost estimates and 
schedules.  From a technical standpoint, analysts need to incorporate these risk 
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K. What Are Our Initial DoE/EM and DoD Agency Observations? 
The DoE sought our services to address cost proposal solicitation, evaluation, 
and effectiveness.  We utilized the DoD cost-variance categories to  focus our study 
on the cost-estimating change category.  We met and held discussions with DoE EM 
personnel.  After meeting with personnel at EM HQ in Washington, DC; at the   
Environmental Management Consolidated Business Center (EMCBC) in Cincinnati, 
OH; and at the Lexington, KY, field office, we identified current trends and 
challenges in the DoE environmental remediation contracting management and 
procurement process. In addition, we met with personnel at AFCEE and NAVFAC.    
The EM acquisition process is complex.  Not only do EM contracting officers 
operate in a challenging environment for reasons mentioned previously, but they 
also have dramatically fewer resources than their DoD counterparts.  According to 
the latest GAO reports, greater funding has improved much of the DoE’s contract 
management and oversight; however, more time is necessary to verify improvement 
quantitatively.  When discussing the proposal process, we found many personnel 
reiterating the issues found in the literature.  .   
Our first actionable point of inquiry going forward will be the proposal 
evaluation process.  For example, SSBs have difficulty evaluating proposals 
because contractors team together through Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) 
entities for proposal formulation and submission.  The large contractors that form the 
LLC allow it to claim large resources and expertise, andsoon after contract award, , 
individuals responsible for proposal writing and development are not available, either 
as key personnel, or as consultants. This can be more detrimental than typical 
acquisitions due to the scale, complexity, and uncertainty in remediation work.    
Considering past performance is a factor for source selection; the new LLC gets the 
credit for past performance it never, as a legal entity, carried out itself.  This is not 
technically a cause of proposal evaluation error, yet this external reality shows that 
whatever score the proposal receives has little impact on how the contractor 
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where, as previously mentioned, contractors take on upfront risk at the expense of 
the customer. Additionally, requirements definition remains the greatest challenge. 
The current process, in our view, lacks the flexibility that could employ contracting 
approaches that would more appropriately address requirements risk.  The 
magnitude of projects, difficult evaluations, limited personnel, linear acquisition 
strategy, and the LLC shortcomings either compound or obfuscate the problem of 
requirements definition.  Currently, the DoE EM expends substantial resources   to 
solicit and evaluate cost proposals that have become extremely complex. For 
example, one cost proposal for the Nationwide-indefinite delivery indefinite quantity 
(IDIQ) solicitation contained over 2,500 pages.  The DoE’s attempt to simplify the 
cost proposal construction included the use of what are called “plug numbers.”  Plug 
numbers are DoE-directed costs for elements of a contract not readily available or 
explicitly defined.  .  In our on-going research we seek to explore the relationship 
between the proposal evaluation and likelihood and/or magnitude of the estimate 
changes in further research. 
Another frustrating challenge that DoE personnel face includes a difficult 
scheduling environment.  This is not to be confused with program schedule as 
outlined in the DoD cost-variance categories, but the acquisition schedule.  Program 
schedule outlays the time to complete a project, acquisition schedule refers to the 
events required for contracting personnel to solicit, award, and begin work on 
projects.  The current requirements force the DoE to ensure external audits through 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and KPMG.  ,DCAA   has not been 
helpful to the DoE.  The DCAA operates on a different schedule, typically six months 
from SSB submission, and then after review, if the audit finds items needing remedy, 
the contracting officer must correct and resubmit.  This resets the six month DCAA 
schedule. Not only are there workforce morale issues with this schedule defect but 
also there are practical implications. The long lead-time between solicitation and 
work start requires what practitioners call “true-up.”  After the contract award, 
estimates are immediately re-baselined, which in our view, invalidates the time and 
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Ahmed (2008, p. 503) conducted a survey among construction firms and industry 
experts to determine the factors that increase the likelihood of cost overruns (cost 
risk). They warn of the dangers of lengthy acquisition schedules, where the 
estimates become more risky as the time between the solicitation and design 
increases.  The underlying issue that causes the re-baselining is the tremendous 
requirements risk.  As the solicitation process begins, the extent of the 
environmental damage is very unclear.  When the EM solicits new work, it often is to 
replace a previous contract.  Work from previous contracts is continuous during the 
new contract solicitation and award. By the time contractor and acquisition personnel 
award the contract, new knowledge of damage requires an immediate estimate 
change. In response, the DoE is now using a private firm, KPMG, for many of its 
audit requirements.   
Re-baselining due to requirements change in the DoD arena stems from two 
major sources: intelligence on enemy capabilities and what the technology 
challenges are (Peck & Scherer, 1962, pp. 46–49). The DoE, on the other hand, has 
to overcome the requirements risk due to poor site characterization.  Our 
discussions with DoE personnel explain their dilemma: the more robust the site 
characterization, the longer it takes to start work, the longer it takes to start work, the 
larger the cost adjustment.  Our review showed no possibility of a positive 
relationship between poor requirements definition and high levels of project 
performance.  The question then becomes  how much requirements definition yields 
an effective, or realistic estimate.  DoE personnel voiced this as the most difficult 
question, and they have yet to find the right balance.  Some did cite the IDIQ 
process as a success, where the larger umbrella contract effectively screened 
contractors through an RFP, and actual work was piecemeal through Request for 
Task Proposals (RTPs).  An abundance of project management literature 
emphasizes the importance of requirements definition and management. As Meli 
(1999) argued, “poor definition of objectives and inadequate allocation of resources 
are two of the most significant factors capable of negatively impacting the projects’ 
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cost estimates improves as project becomes more defined” (p. 103). They conclude 
that 
cost estimates developed during the early stages of the cleanup process are 
based on limited information, but are typically given significant weight in 
making remedy selection and other types of clean up decisions.  For this 
reason, it is important at this state to develop clean up cost estimates that are 
as complete and accurate as possible. (Goldstein & Ritterling, 2001, p. 121) 
Although current cost proposals seem exceedingly robust, they obviously have 
achieved greater completeness and accuracy.  On the other hand, if they are 
complete, their cost controls, or performance measurements, are insufficient.  Our 
observations point to the former; however, our solution should not be to make the 
problem worse by requesting cost proposals with greater detail and justification.  
Instead, the EM should consider broader solutions.  In other words, the cost growth 
phenomenan extends beyond contract managment and administration.  If variables 
in the pre-award sphere have little impact on overall contract or program cost 
performance, then policy makers can reduce current workloads that are not adding 
value.  This can open the door to two phased acquisition approach, and can focus 
research on program management, performance measurement, and risk 
management.   Before we explore more broadly, we must first understand how DoE 
requirements definition quantitatively relates to estimate changes.  According to DoE 
personnel, proposal evaluation, acquisition schedule, and requirements definition 
are not the only sources of potential estimate changes.  Contract type can lead to 
estimate adjustments as well. 
Contract type refers to different contract vehicles: the fixed-price model 
pushes risk to the contractor, and the government assumes risk under the cost 
reimbursement model.  We observed that for smaller projects, contracting personnel 
seek to employ fixed-price vehicles, and for larger projects they use cost plus 
incentives.  Our observations show that for smaller stand-alone projects, firm-fixed 
price has worked well.  Current contracts, such as the West Valley Demonstration 
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snow removal.  Ideally, services like this would be done under fixed-price vehicles, 
however, due to the DoE’s limited acquisition personnel, contracting solicitation, 
evaluation, and management for smaller services are aggregated into the larger 
remediation contract.  Furthermore, there are incumbent workers that the replacing 
contractor must hire, due to collective bargaining agreements with trade unions, 
inhibit cost savings.  The literature sees contract type as a factor for estimate 
changes.  A European Commission found that “the form of procurement and contract 
used by the project sponsor can alter an estimated cost of a project” (Understanding 
and Monitoring, n.d., p. 9).  Oberlender and Trost (2001, p. 181), in a factor analysis 
study, sought to identify which factor groups associate with cost growth.  They found 
that building and labor climate, where contract type is a determinant, account for 
14.5% of explainable cost growth.  In a forthcoming analysis we explore the 
relationship between contract type and estimate changes as well.   
1. Federal and State Environmental Regulation 
The previous factors that go into estimate changes all have one thing in 
common, they are all subject to the decision-making process; a “controllable” part of 
program and contract management.  The last aspect of our discussions included the 
nature of federal environmental remediation, where the projects are very different 
and regulations are different from state to state.  Acquisition personnel explained 
that contractors have difficultly writing Performance Work Statements (PWSs), 
because of unknowns, local regulation changes, and acquisition schedule.  Gaston 
and Bell (1985) painted this picture: 
Regulations are imposed by state legislatures, by regulatory commissions, 
and by city and county governments and their subordinates.  Each entity acts 
at times without regard for actions taken at other levels of government.  The 
potential tangle is staggering when one considers there are 22,250 
governmental jurisdictions with some power to regulate. (p. 709) 
Their research addressed the difficult regulatory burden facing private enterprise, but 
the same difficult standards apply to DoE acquisition personnel trying to meet 
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Our study is not the first time researchers have looked into the causes of 
environmental remediation cost overruns. In Warfel’s (2007) examination of 
insurance solutions for environmental liability issues in the brownfield sites, he 
explained the general causes of cost growth:  
Factors that can result in a cost overrun include, for example (1) discovery 
during the cleanup process that the contamination has spread further than 
what originally was thought; (2) discovery during the cleanup process of 
additional constituents that were not originally anticipated (e.g., discovery of 
oil constituents when removing contaminated soil);  (3) the issuance by the 
board of a more stringent regulatory environmental remediation standard than 
what was originally negotiated with and approved by  the board—this more 
stringent regulatory environmental remediation standard must be met 
because it was issued before the cleanup project was completed by the 
redeveloper; (4) a failure of the proposed technology (e.g., an engineering 
measure such as a liner system) to contain or control the migration of a 
regulated substance; and (5) schedule delays attributed to additional 
remediation work that was not anticipated. (p. 3) 
Warfel (2007) extracted findings similar to our observations.  Requirements 
definition, changing goals due regulatory uncertainly, overly optimistic technology 
solutions, and schedule delays all relate to cost growth. However, we focus on 
attempting to correct those estimates so that the cost overruns do not occur, which 
brings us back to the definition: A cost overrun, by its very nature will never be 
predicted with a cost estimate.  The estimate, therefore, must incorporate the 
inherent risks in a project.  We examine the potential causes, or associative 
properties of factors, that affect early cost-estimate changes.  As a result of our 
observations and meetings with DoE personnel, we developed the model in Figure 5 
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Figure 5. Early Estimate Change Model  
L. Proposed Methodologies  
Inside and outside of academia benchmarking is a natural process of 
identifying the most effective processes that meet individual and/or organizational 
goals.  The methodology itself is not necessarily groundbreaking; however, with its 
careful use and implementation, benchmarking can identify those best practices that 
can bring about necessary transformational change.  Before we utilize this method, 
we first provide relevant literature to identify strengths and weaknesses. 
As McCabe (2001) wrote in Benchmarking in Construction, “if any individual 
or group wishes to consider how it should attempt to improve the way in carries out 
any task(s), the best method is to look at how others do so” (p. 26).  Some of the 
positive benefits of benchmarking include low costs, speed, and relatively simple 
data collection (McCabe, 2001).  Conversely, there are some challenges in 
benchmarking.  A study on the effectiveness of public-sector benchmarking cited 
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(Kouzmin, Loffler, Klages, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1999, p. 121).  Despite the potential 
shortcoming, benchmarking is our initial methodology.   
As we continue with our research, we plan to utilize data from several 
sources.  We will use the Project Assessment and Reporting System (PARS) II, and 
Integrated Planning, Accountability, and Budgeting System (IPABS) databases to 
gather Earned Value Management (EVM) data and www.fbo.gov for contractor 
demographics and contract attributes.  Once built, we will use appropriate statistical 
methods to analyze the data.  We intend to use both  case study analysis and 
regression analysis.  We plan to compare the most current practices in the East 
Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) with historical examples, and illustrate more 
generalizable findings with a quantitative analysis of population data.   
M. Summary 
In this literature review we aimed to shed light on the many aspects of the 
DoE EM’s cost proposal process.  First, we defined environmental remediation.  
Then, we discussed who, at the federal level, executes environmental remediation 
contracts.  After that, we discussed the importance of integrating community 
interests in remediation decisions and how those interests bring about the increasing 
regulatory framework.  In addition, we explored how regulations can impact 
remediation decisions and how they can then create obstacles for site closure.  We 
highlighted six major federal laws that make environmental remediation contracting 
more difficult.  We explained how the DoE contracting environment is more difficult 
than industry or the DoD experience.  Following that, we pointed out some 
successful experiences in government and private industry.  Then, we discussed the 
aspect of cost proposal solicitation and evaluation.  Next, we investigated cost 
growth as a measure of cost proposal effectiveness.  Finally, we discussed our 
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Appendix C. Federal Acquisition Regulation   
15.305  Proposal Evaluation  
(a) Proposal evaluation is an assessment of the proposal and the offeror’s 
ability to perform the prospective contract successfully. An agency shall evaluate 
competitive proposals and then assess their relative qualities solely on the factors 
and subfactors specified in the solicitation. Evaluations may be conducted using any 
rating method or combination of methods, including color or adjectival ratings, 
numerical weights, and ordinal rankings. The relative strengths, deficiencies, 
significant weaknesses, and risks supporting proposal evaluation shall be 
documented in the contract file.  
(1) Cost or price evaluation. Normally, competition establishes price 
reasonableness. Therefore, when contracting on a firm-fixed-price or fixed-
price with economic price adjustment basis, comparison of the proposed 
prices will usually satisfy the requirement to perform a price analysis, and a 
cost analysis need not be performed. In limited situations, a cost analysis 
(see 15.403-1(c)(1)(i)(B)) may be appropriate to establish reasonableness of 
the otherwise successful offeror’s price. When contracting on a cost-
reimbursement basis, evaluations shall include a cost realism analysis to 
determine what the Government should realistically expect to pay for the 
proposed effort, the offeror’s understanding of the work, and the offeror’s 
ability to perform the contract. (See 37.115 for uncompensated overtime 
evaluation.) The contracting officer shall document the cost or price 
evaluation.  
(2) Past performance evaluation.  
(i) Past performance information is one indicator of an offeror’s 
ability to perform the contract successfully. The currency and relevance of 
the information, source of the information, context of the data, and general 
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assessment of past performance information is separate from the 
responsibility determination required under Subpart 9.1.  
(ii) The solicitation shall describe the approach for evaluating past 
performance, including evaluating offerors with no relevant performance 
history, and shall provide offerors an opportunity to identify past or current 
contracts (including Federal, State, and local government and private) for 
efforts similar to the Government requirement. The solicitation shall also 
authorize offerors to provide information on problems encountered on the 
identified contracts and the offeror’s corrective actions. The Government 
shall consider this information, as well as information obtained from any 
other sources, when evaluating the offeror’s past performance. The 
source selection authority shall determine the relevance of similar past 
performance information.  
(iii) The evaluation should take into account past performance 
information regarding predecessor companies, key personnel who have 
relevant experience, or subcontractors that will perform major or critical 
aspects of the requirement when such information is relevant to the instant 
acquisition.  
(iv) In the case of an offeror without a record of relevant past 
performance or for whom information on past performance is not 
available, the offeror may not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably on 
past performance.  
(v) The evaluation should include the past performance of offerors 
in complying with subcontracting plan goals for small disadvantaged 
business (SDB) concerns (see Subpart 19.7), monetary targets for SDB 
participation (see 19.1202), and notifications submitted under 19.1202-
4(b).  
(3) Technical evaluation. When tradeoffs are performed (see 15.101-
1), the source selection records shall include—  
(i) An assessment of each offeror’s ability to accomplish the 
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(ii) A summary, matrix, or quantitative ranking, along with 
appropriate supporting narrative, of each technical proposal using the 
evaluation factors.  
(4) Cost information Cost information may be provided to members of 
the technical evaluation team in accordance with agency procedures.  
(5) Small business subcontracting evaluation. Solicitations must be 
structured to give offers from small business concerns the highest rating for 
the evaluation factors in 15.304(c)(3)(ii) and (c)(5).  
(b) The source selection authority may reject all proposals received in 
response to a solicitation, if doing so is in the best interest of the Government.  
(c) For restrictions on the use of support contractor personnel in proposal 
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